Seton Hall University

eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship

Seton Hall Law

2020

My God Told Me to Hate You: Racism, Religious Liberty and the
Law
Liam McManus

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons

Contents
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 3
THE HISTORY OF RACE AND RELIGION IN AMERICA. ..................................................... 4
RACIST RELIGONS AND THE WORKPLACE ......................................................................... 9
RACISM IN PRISON, RELIGIOUS PRACTICE OR SECURITY THREAT? .......................... 15
MODERN MOVEMENT TOWARDS WIDER DEFINITIONS OF RELIGION AND
GREATER SUPPORT FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM COULD OPEN DOORS FOR WHITE
SUPREMACISTS TO GAIN RELIGIOUS RECOGNITION FOR THEIR PRACTICES. ........ 24
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 28

My God Told Me to Hate You: Racism, Religious Liberty and the Law.

Question Presented: When faced with backlash from mainstream society over racist beliefs,
some white supremacists are claiming to be professing their religious beliefs. But can religious
freedom be used to protect bigotry and hatred?

INTRODUCTION
In the early days of the Trump Administration, President Trump issued the “Presidential
Executive Order Promoting Free Speech and Religious Liberty.”1 According to the text, the
order was intended to direct the executive branch to, “vigorously enforce Federal law’s robust
protections for religious freedom.”2 The order was seen by many commentators as a direct
response to policies of prior administrations believed to be anti-religion. The order mentions the
so-called “Johnson Amendment” prohibiting outward support for political candidates by
churches,3 and the religious based exemptions to preventative care mandates in the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (Obamacare).4 The order itself, and President Trump’s
remarks in signing the order, have been seen as a concession to the right-wing religious groups
that overwhelmingly supported the President in the 2016 election.5

1

Exec. Order No. 13,798, 92 Fed. Reg. 21,674 (May 4, 2017).
Id. § 1.
3
Id. § 2.
4
Id. § 3.
5
Pew Research estimates that more than 80% of those identifying as White, born-again/evangelical Christian voted
for Trump. Jessica Martínez and Gregory A. Smith, How the faithful voted: A preliminary 2016 analysis, PEW
2

3

Opponents have claimed that the goal behind the order is to allow fundamentalist
Christians and fundamentalist groups the ability to legally discriminate against homosexual and
transgender individuals.6 LGBT advocacy groups were especially concerned with the president’s
comments in signing the order, calling for government support for giving faith-based
organizations, “equal right to exercise their deeply held beliefs.”7 However, when the Trump
Administration opened this door to allow for an expanded definition of religious free exercise for
fundamentalist Christians, have they left an opening for other “religions” to find legal support for
discrimination?

THE HISTORY OF RACE AND RELIGION IN AMERICA.
Since the early days of America, religiously affiliated groups have supported racial
discrimination, segregation, and worse, based on their own interpretations of their religious
doctrines. In the years leading up to The American Civil War, the battle over the future of
slavery was heavily religious. Many prominent voices in the Abolition movements belonged to
religious leaders, and many abolition groups were explicitly aligned with a religious order.
However, pro-slavery factions also found justification for their positions in the bible. The bible
makes numerous references to slavery in both the Old and New Testaments.8 Pro-slavery

RESEARCH CENTER (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/09/how-the-faithful-voted-apreliminary-2016-analysis/.
6
Samantha Allen, LGBT Alarm as President Trump Signs ‘Religious Liberty’ Executive Order, THE DAILY BEAST
May 04, 2018, https://www.thedailybeast.com/lgbt-alarm-as-trump-signs-religious-liberty-exec-order.
7
Id.
8
From the Old Testament:
Your male and female slaves are to come from the nations around you; from them you may buy
slaves. You may also buy some of the temporary residents living among you and members of their
clans born in your country, and they will become your property. You can bequeath them to your
children as inherited property and can make them slaves for life, but you must not rule over your
fellow Israelites ruthlessly.
Leviticus 25:44-46 (New International Version).

4

advocates cited these references to justify the institution and reinforce their belief in the
superiority of their own race. Thornton Stringfellow, a Virginia Baptist minister, published an
extensive report on his opinion on the biblical justification for slavery.
You ask me for my opinion about the emancipation movement in the State
of Kentucky. I hold that the emancipation of hereditary slaves by a State is not
commanded, or in any way required by the Bible. The Old Testament and the
New, sanction slavery, but under no circumstances enjoin its abolition, even
among saints. Now, if religion, or the duty we owe our Creator, was inconsistent
with slavery, then this could not be so. If pure religion, therefore, did not require
its abolition under the law of Moses, nor in the church of Christ--we may safely
infer, that our political, moral, and social relations do not require it in a State;
unless a State requires higher moral, social, and religious qualities in its subjects,
than a Gospel church.9
These polar opposite views, unsurprisingly, divided religions and even individual
congregations.10
The use of the bible to support racial discrimination didn’t end with the abolition of
slavery. Religious leaders continued to find biblical justification for discriminatory and
segregationist policies even as the civil rights movement began to chip away at some racial
barriers. Fundamentalist preacher Bob Jones Sr., found justification for segregation in the Acts of
the Apostles.11

From the New Testament:
Slaves, obey your earthly masters with respect and fear, and with sincerity of heart, just as you
would obey Christ. Obey them not only to win their favor when their eye is on you, but as slaves
of Christ, doing the will of God from your heart. Serve wholeheartedly, as if you were serving the
Lord, not people, because you know that the Lord will reward each one for whatever good they do,
whether they are slave or free.
Ephesians 6:5-8 (New International Version).
9
Thornton Stringfellow, D. D., SCRIPTURAL AND STATISTICAL VIEWS IN FAVOR OF SLAVERY 149 (4th ed., with
additions 1856).
10
See eg., Gartin v. Penick, 68 Ky. 110 (1868) A Kentucky parish, split into pro and anti-slavery factions went to
court over the use of the church building and the division of property.
11
“From one man he made all the nations, that they should inhabit the whole earth; and he marked out their
appointed times in history and the boundaries of their lands.” Acts 17:26 (New International Version)
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There is no trouble between a colored Christian and a white Christian.
They operate as individuals and deal with each other as Christians who have their
citizenship in heaven. Up in heaven there will be no boundaries. We will be one
forever with Christ. But we are not one down here, as far as race is concerned and
as far as nations are concerned. God said so, and Paul made it clear when he
preached in Athens in the midst of Athenian culture. He said that God ‘…hath
made of one blood all nations of men…’ But god has also done something else.
He has fixed the bounds of their habitations12
It was this dedication to segregation that would eventually cost The Bob Jones University
its tax-exempt status.13
In the years following the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, individual white
supremacists have also tried to cite their religious practices as a way to avoid integration and
allow them to discriminate. In Newman v. Piggie Park Industries Inc.,14 a South Carolina
restaurant refused to allow African American patrons to eat on the premises. The owner cited,
among other reasons, that his religious beliefs precluded him from having to serve anyone other
than white patrons. The court dismissed this section of his argument. Accepting his right to have
white supremacist beliefs, the court recognized that there is a difference between having the
belief and acting on it. “Undoubtedly defendant Bessinger has a constitutional right to espouse
the religious beliefs of his own choosing, however, he does not have the absolute right to
exercise and practice such beliefs in utter disregard of the clear constitutional rights of other
citizens.”15

12

Is Segregation Spiritual? Address given over radio station WMUU (Apr. 17, 1960) in the archives of Camille K.
Lewis, Ph.D., https://www.drslewis.org/camille/2013/03/15/is-segregation-scriptural-by-bob-jones-sr-1960/.
13
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983) The Supreme Court upheld an IRS
decision stripping the university of its tax exempt status based on its refusal to allow interracial dating or admit
students in an interracial marriage.
14
Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., b390 U.S. 400 (1968) (modified on other grounds).
15
Id at 945.
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When looking at groups that professed white supremacy, the most prominent example is
the Ku Klux Klan. In the years following the Civil War, the rise of the Ku Klux Klan blurred the
line between racism and religion. The group, in its various incarnations from Reconstruction to
today, has relied heavily on Christian symbolism. Though the organization itself does not claim
to be a religion, individual members have made claims that Klan activities deserve First
Amendment protection. When it comes to the right of free speech, courts agree.
In the famous case Brandenberg v. Ohio the Supreme Court sided with a KKK leader’s
right to free speech despite the fact that he was advocating lawlessness and violence, in violation
of an Ohio law then on the books.16 More recently, in Virginia v. Black,17 the Court invalidated a
jury instruction making the burning of a cross per se illegal. Instead, the Court found laws
banning cross burning can be constitutional, when the intent is to intimidate, but when the cross
burning was purely expressive, the right to free speech prevailed. “[J]ust as a State may regulate
only that obscenity which is the most obscene due to its prurient content, so too may a State
choose to prohibit only those forms of intimidation that are most likely to inspire fear of bodily
harm. A ban on cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate is fully consistent with our
holding in R. A. V. and is proscribable under the First Amendment.”18
Courts have been less receptive to protecting KKK activity on religious grounds. In
several cases, explored more fully below, Courts have held that the KKK is not a religion in

16

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
18
Id. at 363. In R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), the Supreme Court held that a ban on fighting words was
permissible, but banning those that advocated a certain point of view was not.
17
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itself, rather a political and social organization, and thus not entitled to protection on free
exercise grounds.
This refusal to recognize the KKK as a religion and their activities as religious has
extended to cross burning as well. In one particular case out of Pennsylvania,19 a local Klan
leader capped a day-long rally on his property with a cross burning. He was cited for violating a
local ordinance that forbid fires of any kind after dark. The defendant tried to find protection
under the First Amendment, claiming the display was religious in nature. “It is the belief of the
Klan that the cross as a burning fire be lifted upon a hill where all people can see it as a light
unto the world pursuant to the religious traditions of the Klan as a Christian organization.”20 The
court was unpersuaded and determined that the KKK did not meet the criteria of a religion.
Interestingly, in doing so, that Pennsylvania court seemed to embrace a very narrow definition of
what qualifies as a religion. “Were we to conclude, on this record, that the KKK is a religion
under the First Amendment, we would have to so qualify every group who came into court with
a Bible, a lighted match and a claim to be a Christian.”21
However, in the 30 years since that decision, the altered social, political, and legal
landscape may be changing in the direction of providing religious protections to groups whose
beliefs are centered around white supremacy. In addition to the support from the religious right,
the Trump Administration has found widespread and vocal support from other right-wing

19

Commonwealth v. Lower, 2 Pa. D. & C.4th 107 (C.P. 1989).
Id. at 108-09.
21
Id. at 114.
20
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groups, some of whom self-identify as religious. Will the policies of the Trump Administration
allow hate-based groups to find legal protections for their discriminatory actions?
In August 2017 thousands of demonstrators and protestors descended on Charlottesville,
Virginia for what was dubbed the “Unite the Right Rally.” The resulting event became a violent
clash between protestors and white supremacist groups. The scene was a highly publicized
demonstration that hate groups were still alive in the United States, and that they have become
more willing to shed their anonymity and openly profess their hatred. However, this new-found
boldness has resulted in backlash in the community at large. Media portrayals and social media
postings have allowed communities to identify members of white supremacist groups and
publicly expose their views. For now, legal safeguards have kept the idea of religious protections
for white supremacists at bay.

RACIST RELIGONS AND THE WORKPLACE

Courts have already established that racism and white supremacy can be protected by the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.22 However, the free speech protection does not
encompass all areas of life, and white supremacists have faced backlash at work and in their
communities. White supremacists and others that have found themselves out of work because of
racist activities or social media posts have not been protected by a right to free speech.23

22

U.S. Const. Amend. 1., See eg, R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 2538 (1992).
One famous example, actress/comedian Rosanne Barr was fired from her ABC sitcom over a Twitter post
perceived as racist. Her claims of free speech protection did not get her job back.
23

9

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prevents employers from discriminating based
on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.24 Since the earliest days of Title VII, employees
have sought protections for a variety of religious beliefs from religious dress25 to exemptions
from working on the holy days of their particular faith.26 Petitioners have sought protections for
more non-traditional beliefs as well. Notably, members of the Ku Klux Klan, and its various
incarnations, have sought free speech protections as well as recognition of the group as a religion
and Title VII protection for members who met with adverse employment action because of their
membership in the organization.
In McMullen v. Carson,27 a clerical worker at a Florida Sheriff’s office was fired after
appearing on a news interview as a recruiter for the local chapter of the Ku Klux Klan. He filed
suit arguing that his termination over his membership in the Klan was a violation of his right to
free speech. The court agreed that he had the right to associate with the Klan and express his
beliefs. However, they recognized the damage that could be done by a law enforcement agency
having prominent Klan members on their payroll. “We hold only that a law enforcement agency
does not violate the First Amendment by discharging an employee whose active participation in
an organization with a history of violent activity, which is antithetical to enforcement of the laws
by state officers, has become known to the public and created an understandably adverse public

24

42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e.
See eg., EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015). (An applicant was refused
employment because her religious headscarf would violate the company dress code.)
26
See eg., Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, (1986) (A school teacher sought accommodation for six
annual religious holidays when the employer only allowed for three. The Supreme Court agreed with the Second
Circuit that the teacher’s proposal to use personal leave for the three additional days was a “reasonable
accommodation” under Title VII and the school board was obliged to accept unless they could show undue
hardship).
27
McMullen v. Carson, 754 F.2d 936 (11th Cir. 1985).
25
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reaction that seriously and dangerously threatens to cripple the ability of the law enforcement
agency to perform effectively its public duties.”28
With free speech defenses off the table, some white supremacists are trying to hide
behind another part of the First Amendment. By claiming to be members of religious groups that
profess racist or white supremacist beliefs, some white supremacists are trying to claim that they
are being discriminated against on religious grounds, in violation of their right to free exercise.
When evaluating any religious claim, the first issue for a court is determine just what is a
religion, and what makes a belief religious. The Supreme Court attempted to answer that in the
1965 case United States v. Seeger.29 In that case the Court had to determine if the beliefs held by
the Defendants constituted religious beliefs in order to qualify for conscientious objector status.
The Court was interpreting the Universal Military Training and Service Act,30 rather than the
Free Exercise Clause, but the analysis the Court used is analogous to that used in free exercise
claims.
The court established a two-part test which has become the benchmark for determining if
beliefs qualify as religion. In order to be considered religious, the belief must be (1) sincerely
held, and (2) Occupy the same place in life as a traditional deity in mainstream religion. In
evaluating the validity of a religious claim, the Court noted that it is only the sincerity of the
belief that is to be evaluated, not the validity of the belief itself. “The validity of what he believes
cannot be questioned. Some theologians, and indeed some examiners, might be tempted to

28

Id at 940.
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, (1965).
30
50 U. S. C. App. § 456 (j) (1958 ed.)
29
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question the existence of the registrant's ‘Supreme Being’ or the truth of his concepts. But these
are inquiries foreclosed to Government.”31
In Seeger the court put the beliefs of the potential conscientious objectors to their twopart test, and in each case, found that the beliefs of each of the objectors met the threshold they
established.
Some members of the Ku Klux Klan have tried to have the organization itself recognized
as a religion, affording themselves and other members the protections that come with the
designation. However, the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission has ruled otherwise,32
thus far, Klan members have not had any success convincing the courts to overrule that decision.
In Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc33 the plaintiff was fired from his job for the sole reason that he
was a member of United Klans of America, considered a sub-group of the Ku Klux Klan. In
finding for the employer, the District court for the Eastern District of Virginia ruled that the
KKK did not fit the statutory definition of religion under Title VII.34 “[T]he proclaimed racist
and anti-Semitic ideology of the organization to which Bellamy belongs takes on, as that
organization, a narrow, temporal and political character inconsistent with the meaning of

31

Id. at 184.
“Social, political, or economic philosophies, as well as mere personal preferences, are not “religious” beliefs
protected by Title VII.” EEOC Compliance Manual § 12 -I(A)(1) n28 available
at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/religion.html.
33
Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. Va. 1973).
34
“The term ‘religion’ includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer
demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious
observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” 42 U.SA.C.S. 2000e. On
appeal, the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals did not rule on the legitimacy of the religious claim. The Plaintiff referred to
the KKK as a “patriotic” organization in his complaint. The 4th Circuit held him to the definition. Bellamy v.
Mason's Stores, Inc. (Richmond), 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974)
.
32
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‘religion as used in [Title VII].”35 In Slater v. King Soopers, Inc36, the Colorado District Court
agreed. In a similar set of facts, Plaintiff Slater was fired for his association with the Ku Klux
Klan. He filed a Title VII based on his belief that the KKK was his religion, and he was entitled
to protection. The court rejected that claim, finding the KKK to be, “political and social in
nature,”37 and upheld the Eastern District of Virginia and the EEOC’s decision that the KKK did
not qualify as a religion for Title VII purposes.
While courts have refused to recognize the KKK as a religion, at least one white supremacist
has convinced a court that his racist beliefs could be considered religious. However, once again,
it was the difference between a belief and the expression of that belief that made a difference to
the court. Wisconsin man Christopher Peterson was extensively quoted in a March 2000
newspaper article about his membership in the World Church of the Creator (also known as
“Creativity”). The group self-identifies as a religion, the central tenant of their beliefs is the
superiority of the white race. Peterson had been a long-time member of the organization and had
held the title of “reverend” for the previous three years. The day after the article appeared,
Peterson was suspended from his job as a supervisor at a telemarketing firm. On his return from
suspension, Peterson was given a letter from the president of the company. The letter
specifically mentioned the newspaper article and expressed concern over Peterson’s ability to
carry out his supervisory roles, as three of his eight direct reports identified as non-white.
Peterson was reinstated in a non-supervisory role, at a lower pay rate.

35

Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1025, 1026 (E.D. Va. 1973).
Slater v. King Soopers, 809 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1992).
37
Id. at 810.
36
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Peterson filed a Title VII suit against the company, claiming his demotion was the direct
result of his religious beliefs. Both sides filed for summary judgement. In his opinion in
Peterson v. Wilmur Communs., Inc.,38 Justice Lynn Adelman in the Eastern District of
Wisconsin applied Peterson’s beliefs in the World Church of the Creator to the two-part test set
forth in United States v. Seeger.

“To satisfy this test, the plaintiff must show that the belief at

issue is ‘sincerely held’ and ‘religious’ in [his or her] own scheme of things.”39 In his analysis,
Judge Adelman saw sincerity in Peterson’s claim that his devotion to The World Church of the
Creator represented religious belief. “These beliefs occupy for plaintiff a place in his life parallel
to that held by a belief in God for believers in more mainstream theistic religions. Thus,
Creativity ‘functions as’ religion for plaintiff. Plaintiff has met his initial burden of showing that
his beliefs constitute a ‘religion’ for purposes of Title VII.”40
Judge Adelman was unconvinced by the Defense claim that similar rulings (specifically
Bellamy and Slater) that held the KKK was not a religion should apply to Peterson’s claim as
well. The Judge dismissed this argument, citing the subjective elements of the Seeger test, as the
reason this claim must be looked at independently.
There were claims brought by the company, on behalf of fellow employees that Peterson
treated African-American and white workers unequally, but the judge dismissed them as
inadmissible hearsay and too vague to show that Peterson acted upon his white supremacist
beliefs in the workplace. This distinction is important to Judge Adelman’s ruling. “[T]he record

38

Peterson v. Wilmur Communs., Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (E.D. Wis. 2002).
Id. at 1018 (citing Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 901 n.12 (7th Cir. 1978)) (quoting Seeger, 380 U.S. at
185).
40
Id. at 1022.
39
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must contain evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that plaintiff engaged or sought
to engage in a religiously-motivated act and was demoted because of it.”41 In the end, Peterson’s
motion for Summary Judgment on liability was granted, the judge finding that, a reasonable jury
would be compelled to find that Peterson’s demotion was based solely on his religious beliefs as
opposed to any action taken in furtherance of those beliefs.
The decision in the Peterson case outraged anti-hate groups. The Southern Poverty Law
Center called the decision “bizarre” and figured the case would be an anomaly in legal reasoning
that other courts would be unlikely to follow.42 It seems as if the Southern Poverty Law center
was correct. Since the Peterson ruling, other Creativity litigants have tried to rely on the
precedent, only to find other courts are not as persuaded as Judge Adelman in Wisconsin. To
date, no other court has made a similar ruling.

RACISM IN PRISON, RELIGIOUS PRACTICE OR SECURITY THREAT?

Attempts have also been made by prisoners to use religious protections as a cover for
racist activities. The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA),43 passed
in 2000, prohibits prisons from imposing burdens on prisoner’s ability to participate in religious
worship. The law was approved by an overwhelming majority in Congress, based, in part, on the

41

Id. at 1024-25.
Race as Religion, INTELLIGENCE REPORT, 2002 Winter Issue, Dec. 18, 2002, https://www.splcenter.org/fightinghate/intelligence-report/2002/race-religion.
43
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, et seq.
42
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concept of redemption through religion, the prospect that convicts could be reformed by finding
moral guidance through religion. Prisoners have used RLUIPA to secure access to religious
materials,44 win allowances for religious dress and grooming,45 and win the right to a religious
diet.46 Furthermore, like Title VII, RLUIPA contains a broad definition of religion. The act
defines “religious exercise” as, “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central
to, a system of religious belief.”47 Congress included language in the statute to make it clear that
they desired RLUIPA to include broad protections for religion. Congress declared that RLUIPA,
“shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent
permitted by the terms of this Act and the Constitution.”48 The Court has further clarified that the
beliefs need to be “sincerely based on a religious belief and not some other motivation.”49
After RLUIPA passed, there was concern in the prison system that the new law could
compromise the carefully controlled prison setting. In Cutter v. Wilkinson,50 the law survived a
constitutional challenge from prison officials. However, in upholding the law, the Supreme
Court also gave prisons a powerful tool to ensure they remained in control. “We do not read
RLUIPA to elevate accommodation of religious observances over an institution's need to
maintain order and safety. Our decisions indicate that an accommodation must be measured so
that it does not override other significant interests.”51 The Supreme Court recognized that

44

See, e.g.., Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2003). (A Muslim prisoner is granted summary judgement
on an RLUIPA claim after prison officials denied him access to prayer oil).
45
See, e.g.., Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015). (Supreme Court upheld Muslim prisoner’s request to maintain a
one-half inch beard, in accordance with his religious beliefs).
46
See, e.g.., Willis v. Comm'r, Ind. Dep't of Corr., 753 F. Supp. 2d 768 (S.D. Ind. 2010). (The prison substantially
burdened the religious practice of orthodox Jewish prisoners when they failed to provide a kosher meal).
47
42 U.S.C.S. § 2000cc-5 (7)(A).
48
42 U.S. Code § 2000cc–3.
49
Holt v. Hobbs, supra at 360-61.
50
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 125 S. Ct. 2113 (2005).
51
Id. at 722.
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Congress never intended RLUIPA to be used as a tool to compromise, among other things,
safety. Congress expects the courts to evaluate claims with, “due deference to the experience
and expertise of prison and jail administrators in establishing necessary regulations and
procedures to maintain good order, security and discipline, consistent with consideration of costs
and limited resources.” 52
This has given prisons the ability to fight back against petty, frivolous, and in some cases
downright ridiculous requests from prisoners. It also gives them the ability to provide some
control over religious expression when, in their opinion, that expression puts prisoners, staff, or
the public at large at risk.
When addressing white supremacy in prison, officials have been especially concerned
with the rise of the Aryan Brotherhood gang. The formation of the gang has been traced to the
California’s San Quentin Prison in the 1960’s.53 In the years since, associated branches of the
gang have spread throughout the country. According to prison gang experts, in order to join the
gang, a potential member must “make bones,” in other words, commit a murder, at the direction
of the gang leadership. Additionally, the Aryan Brotherhood expects complete loyalty from its
members. Behavior considered disloyal, including attempts to disassociate from the gang, is
punishable by death at the hands of other gang members. This attitude of violence has been noted
by prison officials, gang experts, and by courts, and has led to the Aryan Brotherhood’s
recognition as “the most violent gang in the federal prison system.”54

52

Id. at 723, ((quoting Joint Statement 16699)(quoting S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 10)).
SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER: ARYAN BROTHERHOOD, https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremistfiles/group/aryan-brotherhood.
54
Griffin v. Gomez, 741 F.3d 10 (9th Cir. 2014).
53
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The court system has, for the most part, deferred to prison officials, and given them a
wide latitude to restrict the activities of Aryan Brotherhood members, even when officials are
alleged to have violated prisoner’s constitutional rights. In Silverstien v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons
the 10th Circuit rejected an Aryan Brotherhood member’s allegation that his thirty years in
solitary confinement constituted “cruel and unusual punishment.”55 “We must accord substantial
deference to the BOP determination to separate such gang members from each other and keep
influential members of gangs, like Mr. Silverstein, from interacting in the open prison population
for the purpose of inmate safety, preserving internal order and discipline, and maintaining
institutional security.”5657
Segregating gang members so they cannot hold meetings is not cruel and unusual
punishment. With the Eighth Amendment challenge defeated, white supremacists are now trying
to classify their gang meetings as religious services and hoping to gain protection under
RLUIPA. Thus far, prison officials haven’t given in, and the courts have supported them. A 2017
case out of Illinois, Strickland v. Godinez,58 provides an excellent example of how religious
services can be a cover for gang activity.
Plaintiff Eric Strickland is an inmate in the Illinois prison system. He is a professed follower
of the Asatru religion. Asatru, also sometimes called Odinism or Paganism, is a religion based on

55

Silverstein v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 559 F. App'x 739 (10th Cir. 2014). Petitioner Silverstien was a so-called
“commissioner” in the Aryan Brotherhood, one member of the three-person leadership of the gang. Originally
convicted of bank robbery, and sentenced to 15 years in prison, Silverstien was convicted of three murders including
the murder of a prison guard and the murder of the leader of a rival African American gang.
56
Id. at 761.
57
See also, Griffin v. Gomez, 741 F.3d 10 (9th Cir. 2014) The 9th Circuit found the California prison system was
compliant with the 8th Amendment with keeping another Aryan Brotherhood commissioner in a “security housing
unit” a form of solitary confinement for more than 35 years.
58
Strickland v. Godinez, No. 3:14-CV-962-NJR-DGW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39707 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2017)
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the worship of ancient Norse gods. Asatru appeals to many believers that feel the Northern
European origins make Asatru a “white” religion, as opposed to the Middle Eastern roots of the
Judeo-Christians faiths. The religion is spreading through social media and other outlets and is
becoming the religion of choice for many white supremacists.59
Strickland was transferred to the Lawrence Correctional Center after being suspected of
trying to start a white supremist gang at another prison. Once at Lawrence, he made requests for
religious accommodations including religious artifacts in his cell and in the chapel,60 and for the
authority to conduct group Asatru services. The prison agreed to many of his requests, including
allowing for regular group services in the prison chapel. The services were required to follow the
Illinois Administrative Code which required, among other things, for a guard to be present and
monitor the services. According to the undisputed facts, when that monitor was an intelligence
officer, the services followed the regulations. However, when an intelligence officer was not
available, the staff observer noted that Strickland spent the service time in private discussion
with two other inmates. The services were held regularly for almost two years before prison
officials ordered them stopped because they suspected Strickland was using them to recruit new
gang members, and plan gang activity. This reversal from prison staff formed a major part of
Strickland’s RLUIPA suit.

Daryl Johnson, Hate In God’s Name, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, Sep. 25, 2017,
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Strickland claimed that the refusal to allow him to participate in group worship services was
a substantial burden on his religious practice. In response, the prison claimed to have a
compelling interest in preventing gang-related activity. In evaluating the claim, Justice Nancy Jo
Rosenstengel of the Southern District of Illinois focused heavily on Strickland’s individual
behavior, both as an inmate in Lawrence Correctional Center, and in other prisons. As the court
put it, “the conclusion cannot be made in a vacuum and without reference to his specific
conduct.”61 The court cited Strickland’s behavior at the approved meetings, specifically, his
conversations with other inmates outside the normal worship program. The court also looked at
Strickland’s record of attempting to start a white supremacist gang in another prison (the reason
for his transfer to Lawrence in the first place), also his numerous white supremacist and Nazi
tattoos, and his request for background checks on proposed members of the worship group.62
Interestingly, Justice Rosenstengel issued a very narrow holding concerning Asatru worship
in this case. In her ruling, based on facts specific to Strictland’s claim, Justice Rosenstengel held
that Stricktland’s conduct at these services raised legitimate prison safety concerns, and upheld
summary judgment in favor of the prison. However, in dicta, Justice Rosenstengel said that a
similar claim, brought by a different Asatru prisoner, could possibly succeed. The judge noted
that an intelligence officer closely monitoring all services could be a less restrictive means of
ensuring security while allowing Asatru/Odinist worship to continue. “Thus, for a typical
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adherent of Odinism, an outright ban on group worship may violate RLUIPA and lead to
injunctive relief.”63
This hypothetical would seem to be an RLUIPA parallel to the Title VII Peterson case.
Strickland’s removal from group worship was not based on his beliefs, but rather on how he
chose to act on those beliefs. Justice Rosenstengel’s “typical adherent of Odinism” might prevail
if it was determined that the prison was restricting worship based solely on the white supremacist
nature of the religion.
Even in RLUIPA suits when prisoners have only asked for access to Asatru or Odinist
literature, prison staff has argued, and courts have agreed, that the literature promotes racial
violence, and the prison’s compelling interest in safety and security outweigh the prisoner’s
religious need.
Inmate Garry Borzych, a self-identified Odinist, filed an RLUIPA suit against Wisconsin
prison officials64 after he was denied access to three books he claimed were religious texts.65 The
Seventh Circuit was not convinced that any violation of RLUIPA had occurred.
First, the court ruled that denying Borzych the texts he requested was in no way a
substantial burden on his ability to practice Odinism. The claim that the texts were Odinist, or
even religious in nature was based only on the say-so of Borzych and other inmates. In their own
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evaluation the court found that two of the three texts66 did not relate to Odinism at all, and the
third67 was described by its own author as not authoritative and the rituals described within are
fictitious. “A book about fictitious rituals, rather than actual ones, is not vital to any religious
practice.”68
The court did find that all three books contain white supremist themes, including advocating
violence to promote racist beliefs. It is on this basis that the prison claims to have banned the
books. Borzych suggested that instead of an outright ban, the prison could simply redact the
sections advocating violence. The court did not consider this reasonable since the violent themes
were so prevalent in the books. Instead, they found that the ban was the least restrictive means of
furthering the compelling interest in safety. “[Prison Officials’] principal argument is that the
books promote violence to exalt the status of whites and demean other races; it is the means
rather than the underlying racist view that the defendants contend (and we hold) may be
forbidden in prisoners' reading matter.”69
Barletta v. Quiros70 was another attempt by a Connecticut prisoner to recover for alleged
civil rights violations based on alleged mistreatment due to his adherence to a suspected white
supremacist religion, this time on First Amendment grounds.71 Plaintiff John Barletta, another
professed member of the World Church of the Creator, was dubbed a gang member upon his
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arrival at a Connecticut prison. As a prisoner marked as a gang member, Barletta was subject to
additional security measures and restrictions on his privileges. Barletta’s claim was that he was
not a gang member, but instead a member of a religion. His suit claimed the restrictions placed
on him, including the confiscation of his “religious” texts were a violation of his First
Amendment right to the free exercise of his religion.
The Connecticut District Court, however, disagreed. While the court did not rule definitively
on Barletta’s claim that Creativity should be given religious status, it did it discuss in dicta. The
court correctly pointed out that no authority binding on the Connecticut court had ruled on the
status of Creativity, and no court that had considered a First Amendment claim based on
membership in the Church of the Creator had found it to be a religion. The court did
acknowledge the Peterson decision in a footnote, but distinguished it from Barletta’s claim.
Peterson concerned Creativity as a religion in a Title VII claim, which the court noted is,
“…broader than the standard applied in First Amendment Cases.” The claim was dismissed on
the grounds that the defendants, as state actors, had qualified immunity and in the court’s view,
“no reasonable correctional official would understand that his actions violated the plaintiff's
constitutional rights.”72
White supremacist individuals and groups are prevalent in America’s prisons. Prison officials
are doing everything within their power to control the potentially violent behavior of these
inmates. Even when prisoners are claiming religious protection for their white supremacist
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activities and materials, the strong protection of RLUIPA cannot overcome the even stronger
interest in safety and security.

MODERN MOVEMENT TOWARDS WIDER DEFINITIONS OF
RELIGION AND GREATER SUPPORT FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
COULD OPEN DOORS FOR WHITE SUPREMACISTS TO GAIN
RELIGIOUS RECOGNITION FOR THEIR PRACTICES.

In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,73 three closely held corporations filed a suit
under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)74 to challenge the Obamacare mandate
that they provide insurance coverage for certain forms of contraceptives. According to the suit,
covering these particular contraceptives was against the firmly held religious beliefs of the
company’s owners, and placed a substantial burden on their religious exercise. The Supreme
Court agreed.
The case was not about asking for permission to discriminate based on religious belief,
but there are some who saw the decision as a move in that direction. Justice Ginsburg, in her
dissent, warned that the majority decision risked sending religious freedom jurisprudence down a
slippery slope. Specifically mentioning Piggie Park, Justice Ginsburg questioned the wisdom of
the court opening this door even a little bit. Theorizing that the court’s interpretation of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act could be used to overturn cases like Piggie Park. “Would
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RFRA require exemptions in cases of this ilk?” she asks. “And if not, how does the Court divine
which religious beliefs are worthy of accommodation, and which are not?”75
The majority opinion discounts that suggestion with little discussion. Only stating that,
“Our decision today provides no such shield.”76 However, the language of the decision could do
just that: “…in these cases, the Hahns and Greens and their companies sincerely believe that
providing the insurance coverage demanded by the HHS regulations lies on the forbidden side of
the line, and it is not for us to say that their religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial.
Instead, our ‘narrow function . . . in this context is to determine’ whether the line drawn reflects
‘an honest conviction,’ and there is no dispute that it does.”77 Would ‘an honest conviction’
about racial superiority or segregation lead to a similar result?
In 2018, the Supreme Court may have moved even closer to protecting white supremacy
as a religious belief. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n,78 considered the
question of whether religious beliefs could be used to refuse to provide services for a same sex
wedding by a public accommodation. In this case, a Colorado baker, Jack Phillips, refused to
provide a wedding cake for a same-sex wedding. Citing his deep Christian beliefs, the baker
considered providing the cake to be condoning something that is against his religious beliefs.
This ran afoul of Colorado’s public accommodation law and the suit followed.79 Though the
court remanded the case on due process, several justices offered opinions which might suggest
they are willing to test out Justice Ginsburg’s slippery slope. In his concurrence, Justice Gorsuch,
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joined by Justice Alito (who wrote the majority opinion in Hobby Lobby) seems to offer broad
support to accommodating fringe religious beliefs, no matter how far outside the mainstream
they may seem. “Just as it is the ‘proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence’ that we protect
speech that we hate, it must be the proudest boast of our free exercise jurisprudence that we
protect religious beliefs that we find offensive.”80
Justice Thomas expresses similar views in his concurrence. Celebrating the victory for
religious liberty and adding additional free speech support to Phillips’s claim, he accuses
supporters of same-sex marriage of trying to stamp out all dissent. He compares Phillips’s refusal
to provide a same-sex wedding cake to other issues of homophobia and racism that have been
brought before the Supreme Court. “Moreover, it is also hard to see how Phillips’s statement is
worse than the racist, demeaning, and even threatening speech toward blacks that this Court has
tolerated in previous decisions.”81 Justice Thomas celebrated the decision in Masterpiece
Cakeshop as a victory for religious freedom proclaiming, “it seems that religious liberty has
lived to fight another day.”82
But when that day comes, what will the fight look like? It seems that at least three
justices feel that religious convictions should allow some business owners to violate public
accommodations laws when the request of a prospective patron conflicts with those convictions.
Like the Trump Administration’s order “Promoting Free Speech and Religious Liberty,” it is
likely that these Justices’ position only relates to the conservative Christian position that
homosexuality is a sin. However, it is not difficult to see how these opinions could be used to
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defend white supremacist religious views in the same way they were used to trump up antihomosexual religious views.
If, under similar facts as Masterpiece Cakeshop, a store owner refused to provide services
to an interracial wedding, would the analysis remain the same? In his concurrence, Justice
Gorsuch, like the majority opinion, made extensive note of the commission’s attitude towards
Phillips’ professed beliefs. The opinion specifically mentioned the commission calling Phillips’s
beliefs despicable and referring to them as rhetorical. However, it is not unbelievable, in fact it is
highly likely, that a commission facing complaint about a business refusing to serve minority
customers would react in the same way. Justice Gorsuch’s words seem to apply equally to that
situation.
Many may agree with the Commission and consider Mr. Phillips’s religious
beliefs irrational or offensive. Some may believe he misinterprets the teachings of
his faith. And, to be sure, this Court has held same-sex marriage a matter of
constitutional right83 and various States have enacted laws that preclude
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. But it is also true that no
bureaucratic judgment condemning a sincerely held religious belief as “irrational”
or “offensive” will ever survive strict scrutiny under the First Amendment.84
The Supreme Court may be painting itself into a corner. It stands to reason that if
discrimination against homosexuals is permitted based on sincere religious beliefs, that there is a
logical argument that discrimination based on other classifications including race, sex, or
national origin should be protected too. If and when the Supreme Court is faced with this
question, it may be forced to decide definitively one way or the other. If it hopes to preserve the
ability for conservative Christians to exclude homosexuals on religious grounds, it may be forced

83

The court also held interracial marriage to be a constitutional right, despite state and local laws to the contrary.
See, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
84
Id. at 1737.

27

to accept the exclusion of other classes by followers of other religions. On the other hand, if the
Court wishes to preserve the compelling government interest of maintaining equality in hiring
and public accommodation, it may be forced to reevaluate the protections it has given other
religious groups to discriminate based on sexual orientation.

CONCLUSION
For decades in the post-Civil Rights era, American courts have kept white supremacists
from finding protection for their views a religious practice. However, in recent years, the
changing political landscape has emboldened racist groups to openly express their views in the
public forum. At the same time, cracks have begun to form in the solid wall that had been built
between religious protection and bigotry.

Courts have been careful to distinguish between religious belief and the expression of
that belief. The courts have ruled that Americans have a right to whatever beliefs they choose, no
matter how offensive to the general morality, or how far outside the mainstream those beliefs
are. It is, however, the action associated with those beliefs that have led to trouble for some
believers. Once those beliefs cross that line and become actions, religious freedom has no longer
worked as a defense.
Now, under the guise of restoring religious liberties that some say have been threatened
or lost altogether, courts have allowed mainstream religious groups to use their beliefs to exclude
sexual practices that they claim violate tenants of their religions. In doing so, they appear to have
crossed the line between protecting belief and protecting expression. It is not difficult to see how
28

fringe religions might attempt to build off these rulings to gain the same protection for white
supremist views.
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